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PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUST 
DISCHARGE: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL 
STATUTE 
Jack Stieber* 
Michael Murray** 
Each year labor arbitrators in the United States decide thousands 
of grievances that have been brought by unions on behalf of their 
members against employers. Although this private voluntary system 
of arbitration has its shortcomings, both unions and employers believe 
that it affords due process to workers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Grievance arbitration provisions are found in over ninety-
five percent of all collectively bargained labor contracts. 1 
Grievances concerning discipline and discharge constitute roughly forty 
percent of all issues submitted to arbitration. This is by far the largest 
proportion of issues submitted to arbitration, and reflects a ten percent 
rise from the early 1970's. 2 Moreover, it appears that discharge cases 
are appealed to arbitration about twice as frequently as grievances in-
volving lesser disciplinary penalties. 3 The seriousness of the discharge 
penalty to the affected employee and the frequency with which American 
employers invoke it have prompted much scholarly commentary; many 
commentators have criticized the common law employment-at-will doc-
trine as it applies to employees who are not protected by collective 
bargaining agreements or by anti-discrimination legislation, civil service, 
or teacher tenure arrangements. 4 
• Director, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University. B.S.S., 1940, 
City College of New York; M.A., 1948, University of Minnesota; Ph.D., 1956, Harvard University. 
•• Member, State Bar of Michigan. B.A., 1972, Michigan State University; J.D., 1975, Univer-
sity of Michigan; M.L.I.R., 1982, Michigan State University. 
I. Acording to a Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 major collective bargaining 
agreements, arbitration of grievances is provided for in 96% of the sample contracts. 2 COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 51:5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BNA SURVEY). In 
a speech reported in Daily Record No. 206, October 25, 1982, A-8 (Bureau of National Af-
fairs, Wash., D.C.), the Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor said the percentage 
of arbitration provisions had risen to 980Jo. 
2. 34 FMCS ANN. REP. 41 (1982). 
3. See generally D. BEELER, DISCIPLINE & DISCHARGE (1978) (discussing arbitration decisions 
involving a variety of employee grievances). 
4. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment 
At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: 
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, 
Strangers No More: All Workers Entitled to Just Cause Protection Under Title VII, 2 INous. 
REL. L.J. 519, (I 978); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in ihe 
319 
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We argue that only a federal statute can fully protect American 
workers from the harsh consequences of the employment-at-will rule. 
Part I of this Article outlines the nature and scope of the problems 
caused by the at-will doctrine. Part II surveys a variety of potential 
solutions io these problems - unionism, voluntary internal grievance 
mechanisms, existing statutes, the Constitution, and judicially created 
exceptions to the at-will rule - and finds each an inadequate source 
of protection. The final Part urges the enactment of a federal statute 
to protect all American workers from unjust dicharge and sets out 
several substantive criteria that such a statute should meet. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Discharged employees often ask attorneys, labor relations pro-
fessionals, and government labor agencies what recourse is available 
to them. The Michigan Department of Labor reports that it receives 
hundreds of such queries every month; 5 when asked what it can do 
to help, the Department answers, "probably nothing, because the 
reasons why most people are fired are not against the law. " 6 
A. The Nature of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine 
Unionized workers in the private sector are shielded from unjust 
discharge by collective bargaining agreements; government employees 
are protected either through public sector collective bargaining or civil 
service procedures. Most teachers are covered by tenure laws. Specific 
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees 
Against Unjust Discharge, 32 INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. PROC. 155 (1980); Summers, In-
dividual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481-533 (1976); 
The Growing Costs of Firing Nonunion Workers, Bus. WK., April 6, 1981, at 95; Stieber, Speak 
Up, Get Fired, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979, at E-19, col. 2. 
The United States stands almost alone among democratic industrialized nations in not providing 
legal protection against unjust discharge for all wage-earning and salaried employees. British, 
Japanese, Swedish, and West German law all protect to some extent against discharge without 
an objective cause. See Bellace, A Right to Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 208 (1983). 
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") is the oldest specialized agency in the United 
Nations and the only one with tripartite representation from labor, management, and government. At 
its June 1982 conference, the ILO adopted a Convention and a Recommendation on termination 
of employment. The Convention contains a number of critical provisions concerning termination 
of employment based on the individual capacity or conduct of the worker. Its general tenor 
was to limit the employer's right to terminate employment at will. The United States was the 
only major indistrialized nation whose employers' and government representatives voted against 
the Convention. See id. at 211. 
5. Michigan Department of Labor, Statement of Office of Public Affairs (April 14, 1980) 
(unpublished document) (on file with the authors). 
6. Id. 
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groups of employees (the handicapped, veterans, and those between 
the ages of forty and seventy) are protected from discriminatory employ-
ment practices by federal and state anti-discrimination legislation. 
Women and minorities are the primary beneficiaries of legislation pro-
scribing discriminatory treatment on the basis of race or sex. 1 Although 
the precise scope of this statutory protection is debatable, these laws 
unquestionably limit the previously unfettered discretion of employers 
to discharge and otherwise discriminate against these employees. 
The employment-at-will doctrine leaves the balance of the work force 
largely unprotected. To the extent that they cannot demonstrate pro-
hibited discrimination, this doctrine also jeopardizes groups protected 
by statutes. The doctrine holds that oral contracts of employment under 
which the employee supplies no consideration other than his labor are 
terminable at the will of either party. As Professor C.W. Summers 
has shown in his review of the historical roots of that rule, there is 
little justification for its continued existence. 8 Nor do contemporary 
notions of fairness favor giving employers an unfettered right to fire 
at will, given the devastating effect of this right on individual employees. 9 
Yet, until very recently, few commentators argued that private employers 
had no right to discharge employees at will in the absence of an ap-
plicable statute or unmistakable public policy. The courts have held 
that privately employed individuals may be discharged for "any or no 
reason" 10 and that an oral contract of employment "is not violated 
even by an arbitrary, and capricious discharge." 11 
Case law indicates that nonunionized employees are discharged for 
a wide variety of reasons. Workers have been fired, inter alia, for being 
reluctant to testify against their supervisors in criminal investigations, 12 
for refusing to submit to a "psychological stress evaluation test," 13 
for testifying truthfully but against employer interests in an ad-
ministrative proceeding, 14 and for filing a worker's compensation 
claim. 15 Hourly workers and lower level salaried employees are not 
the only victims of the American common law employment-at-will doc-
trine. For example, a fifty-two year old executive was given seventy-
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979), 
proscribes discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. Ill 
1979), bars discrimination against workers aged 40 to 70. The handicapped are protected by 
the Employment Opportunities for Handicapped Individuals Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 795-795j (Supp. 
Ill 1979). 
8. Summer, supra note 4, at 484-86. 
10. Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974). 
II. Hernden v. Consumers Power Co., 72 Mich. App. 349,356,249 N.W.2d 419,422 (1976). 
12. Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 2, 1981, at 1-H, col. 2. 
13. Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977). 
14. Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981). 
15. Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (1978). 
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two hours to clean out his desk and vacate the premises, allegedly 
because his job was being eliminated after a corporate reorganization. 
He subsequently learned that the job was reestablished after he left. 
Fourteen months later he was still looking for suitable employment 
and wondering why he had been let go. 16 
Some courts have refused to sanction discharges which run afoul 
of a discrete "public policy." Early examples include cases in which 
employees were fired for rejecting sexual advances, 11 refusing to evade 
jury duty, 18 filing a worker's compensation claim, 19 refusing to alter 
pollution control reports, 20 and refusing to participate in an alleged 
price-fixing scheme. 21 At least one state supreme court has held that 
a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy 
which an employee may refuse to violate without being subject to 
dicharge. 22 These few cases do not, however, signal a broad abandon-
ment of the employment-at-will doctrine; 23 rather, they represent only 
a narrow exception to the general rule permitting discharge. 
B. The Scope of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine 
In 1981, there were approximately seventy-five million nonagricultural 
workers on private payrolls in the United States. 24 Of these, fewer than 
sixteen million, or twenty-two percent, were represented by labor 
organizations. 25 Some fifty-nine million private sector employees re-
main unprotected against arbitrary and possibly unfair disciplinary 
penalties, including discharge, that may be imposed unilaterally by 
employers for unacceptable behavior. 
16. Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1980, at I, col. 5. One of the authors of this Article received more 
than a hundred letters and phone calls, most of them from middle management persons who 
had been discharged, allegedly without cause, after he wrote an article that appeared on the 
Op-Ed page of the New York Times, see Stieber, Speak Up, Get Fired, N.Y. Times, June 10, 
1979, at E-19, col. 2, and was quoted in Business Week, see The Growing Cost of Firing Non-
union Workers, Bus. WK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 95. 
17. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549. 
18. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). 
19. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). 
20. Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978). 
21. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). 
22. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,417 A.2d 505 (1980). Cf. Suchodolski 
v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982). 
23. For a comprehensive collection of cases, see Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982). For an 
excellent state-by-state summary of recent developments in this area see THE EMPLOYMENT-AT 
WILL ISSUE, 111 LAB. REL. REP. BNA No. 23 (Nov. 22, 1982) (concluding that 20 states now 
recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine) [hereinafter cited as BNA 
REPORT). 
24. 105 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1982, at 65 (table 8). 
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EARNINGS AND OTHER 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZED WORKERS, MAY, 1980 (1981). 
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Strong arguments support allowing employers an unfettered right 
to discharge employees who are still undergoing a probationary period 
without having to prove "just cause." Consequently, most union 
agreements provide that employers may dismiss workers during the first 
thirty to ninety days of employment without a showing of just cause. 26 
Assuming a probationary period of six months, some twelve million 
nonunionized probationary employees would not be entitled to protec-
tion against unjust discharge. 21 The remaining forty-seven million 
unorganized private sector employees who have completed probationary 
periods should be protected from at-will discharge. 
In about half of all discharge cases appealed to arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements the arbitrator finds just cause for the 
discharge. Excessive absenteeism or tardiness, loafing or sleeping on 
the job, leaving work without permission, fighting, insubordination, 
using profanity or abusive language to supervisors, falsifying records, 
theft, dishonesty, incompetence, gross negligence or carelessness, gambl-
ing, possessing or using drugs or alcoholic beverages at work, or report-
ing to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol, can seriously impair 
an employee's work performance and, if proven, will usually constitute 
just cause for discharge. 28 Research based on published arbitration deci-
sions, however, indicates that in over fifty percent of all discharge cases, 
the employer did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy an arbitrator 
that the discharge was ju_stified. 29 In such cases, arbitrators usually 
reinstate the grievant to his former job with full, partial, or no back 
pay depending upon the circumstances in each case. If unorganized 
discharged employees had an analogous right to appeal to an impartial 
tribunal, they would almost certainly fare at least as well as discharged 
unionized workers whose cases are appealed to arbitration. 
There are no statistics on the number of unorganized employees who 
are discharged "for cause" each year in the United States, much less 
how many would have been found to have been dealt with unfairly 
had they had recourse to impartial arbitration. Indeed, we do not know 
how many discharge grievances are appealed to arbitration under col-
lective bargaining agreements or the number in which the grievant is 
26. See BNA SURVEY, supra note I, at 55:61. 
27. In January 1981, 18.2% of all employees had been on their jobs for six months or less. 
Job Tenure of Workers in January 1981, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1982, at 34. We have 
assumed that 20% of all nonunionized workers in the private sector had six months or less ex-
perience with their current employers. 
28. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652-56 (3d ed. 1973). 
29. G. ADAMS, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION OF DISCHARGE CASES 41 (1978); Holly, The Arbitra-
tion of Discharge Cases: A Case Study, 10 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PROC. 16 (1957); Jones, Ramifica-
tions of Back-Pay A wards in Suspension and Discharge Cases, 22 NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. PROC. 
163, 167 (1957). 
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sustained. We do, however, have data which enable us to make a rough 
estimate of the magnitude of the problem. 
Unpublished figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") in-
dicate that, between 1959 and 1971, the mean annual discharge rate was 
about 4.6% in manufacturing. 30 During the early 1950's, when the BLS 
was still publishing monthly discharge rates, the annual rate per hundred 
employees in manufacturing appears to have been somewhat lower -
about 4.0%. 31 A recently completed survey of a sample of Michigan 
employers found that the annual discharge rate in 1980 for all industries 
was 6.8%. An industry breakdown showed a rate of 4.8% in manufac-
turing, a somewhat lower rate among financial employers (3.7%), and 
the highest rate among service employers (10.5%). 32 
These studies suggest that a conservative estimate of the annual 
discharge rate for all private sector employees would be approximately 
4.0%. Assuming that the discharge rate for employees with six months 
or less service is three times that for all employees, the discharge rate 
for employees with more than six months service would be reduced 
to about 3 .00/o. Applying this rate to the forty-seven million employees 
who have completed their probationary periods, we find that some 1.4 
million nonprobationary employees were discharged in 1981. 
What proportion of these discharges is likely to have been without 
just cause? It is impossible to tell. Suppose, however, that: (1) unor-
ganized workers had the same right of appeal to an impartial tribunal 
as unionized workers; (2) one out of every five discharged employees 
- about 280,000 individuals - exercised this right; and (3) as in 
reported arbitration cases, fifty percent of such appeals were decided 
in favor of the discharged employees. Based on these assumptions, some 
140,000 discharged nonunionized workers with more than six months 
service would have been reinstated to their jobs with full, partial, or 
no back pay. 
We believe that the foregoing estimates and assumptions are con-
servative and reasonable. Even allowing for major discrepancies in the 
data and the assumptions, it is clear that there are many thousands 
of workers who are discharged without cause because of the at-will rule. 
Such is the nature and the magnitude of the problem. We turn now 
to a consideration of alternative approaches to providing protection 
against unjust discharge in the United States. 
30. Medoff, Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing, 69 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 380, 389 (1979) (listing monthly figure of .38%). 
31. 77 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 86 (1954) (table B-1). 
32. R. Block, J. Stieber & D. Pincus, Collective Bargaining and The Labor Market For Discharged 
Workers: A Preliminary Analysis (March 1982) (unpublished paper based on research 
supported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Grant No. 21-26-80-11) (on file with the authors). 
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II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO A STATUTORY APPROACH 
A. Unionism 
It can be argued that if private employees wish to obtain review and 
arbitration of discharges, they should organize to obtain such protec-
tion through collective bargaining. To grant this protection to non-
unionized employees by statute or legal innovation could be viewed 
as giving "for free" that which union men and women have struggled 
long and hard to obtain. 33 
One difficulty with this argument is that the tide of unionization 
appears to be receding rather than advancing. Between 1960 and 1980, 
the percentage of unionized nonagricultural employees fell from 31.5% 
to 23.3%. 34 Even in manufacturing, where unions remain strongest, 
union membership dropped from 51.3% of all employees in 1960 to 
40.0% in 1978. 35 
It is the consensus of industrial relations specialists that unions will 
not soon reverse this trend. 36 In addition, a recent analysis casts doubt 
on the prospect of unionism in the rapidly growing service sector of 
the economy. 37 
Another problem is that under the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA") even employees who join unions do not receive the benefits 
of unionization unless they represent a majority of the bargaining unit 
in which they are employed. Thus, if 51 % of a plant's workers vote 
not to unionize, 100% of the individuals in the plant remain unprotected 
from unjust discharge. Furthermore, foremen, supervisors, and other 
managerial employees are not covered by the NLRA. 37 For these reasons, 
unionism is not an adequate solution to the problem of protecting 
employees from unjust discharge. 
B. Voluntary Employer Systems 
A second potential solution is the voluntary adoption by private 
employers of a system of grievance adjustment that includes arbitra-
33. See the exchange of letters between the president of the United Plant Guard Workers 
of America and the president of the American Arbitration Association which focus on the con-
troversy of the AAA's neutrality. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 131, at A-2 (July 6, 1979), and 
No. 136, at A-4 (July 6, 1979). 
34. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS NEWS, Sept. 3, 1979, Table 5. See also supra note 25. 
35. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (1980) (tables 72, 74, 162). 
36. THE SHRINKING PERIMETER 203 (H. Juris & M. Roomkin eds. 1980). 
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a) (1976). Supervisors are explicitly not covered 
by the NLRA, and the courts have inferred a similar exclusion for managers. See generally NLRB 
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
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tion. Robert Coulson, president of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, notes that nine out of ten nonunion employers are reported to 
have some mechanism for handling employee complaints, most of them 
utilizing an "open door" policy under which management makes the 
final decision. 38 Coulson proposes the voluntary use of arbitration as 
a final recourse where significant complaints are involved. 
Many companies, including Northrup Corporation, Trans World Air-
lines, the American Optical Company, Polaroid, and Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass, have adopted voluntary arbitration for their nonunion em-
ployees. 39 A study of twenty-six large nonunion companies found that 
two had formal procedures for arbitration of final-step grievances, with 
the company paying the arbitrator's fee. 40 In these companies, the ar-
bitration step is used very infrequently. Other employers, including 
Xerox, General Electric, Boeing, and McDonald's, have tried an alter-
native approach: -appointing a company ombudsman. 
Such unilaterally instituted programs are rare, though, according to 
studies by The Conference Board and the Bureau of National Affairs. 41 
Although such voluntary systems are highly desirable, experience and 
common sense suggest that the employers most in need of outside review 
would be those least likely to provide it. 
The approach most likely to be voluntarily adopted by employers 
would be a system of review wherein some level of management would 
have the last word. Any such system, though, is unlikely to enjoy great 
credibility among employees. A Conference Board study of nonunion 
complaint systems found that "[g]etting employees to make use of a 
complaint procedure is harder than one might think. In evaluating their 
complaint systems . . . some executives noted that the systems were 
rarely used, and this, of course, seriously affects their credibility. " 42 
The report noted that in most companies terminations were rarely ap-
pealed through the complaint process. 43 
Another deficiency of voluntary systems is that they do not usually 
bind the employer: a benefit unilaterally granted by a nonunion employer 
may also be unilaterally revoked. Although a few decisions have held 
that an employer is bound by voluntarily adopted limitations on its 
discharge prerogatives, 44 the impact of such decisions is probably quite 
38. Coulson, Arbitration for the Individual Employee, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J. 406 (1979). 
39. Id. at 412-13. 
40. F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES 299 (1980). 
41. See THE CONfERENCE BoARD, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS: A CORPORATE APPRAISAL 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NONUNION CoMPLAJNT SYSTEMS); Policies for Unorganized Employees, 
PPF Survey No. 125, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C., April, 1979. 
42. NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS, supra note 41. 
43. Id. at 41. 
44. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 
880 (1980); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). 
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limited. 45 Thus, measures voluntarily established by the employer are 
unlikely to afford much protection against unjust discharge. 
C. Existing Law 
At least two commentators contend that present law, properly in-
terpreted, already protects the unorganized private employee from un-
just discharge. Though we disagree with these commentators for the 
reason explained in the pages that follow, they have written imaginative 
and scholarly pieces, to which we are unable to do full justice in these 
few pages. 
1. Title VII- Professor A. W. Blumrosen argues that Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")46 as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, guarantees all workers the right to be free from 
discharge other than that for just cause. 47 Professor Blumrosen reasons 
that when the Supreme Court held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co. 48 that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks, 
it "extended to all workers the law of discrimination that had been 
developed in cases involving discrimination against minorities and 
One study indicates that 13 states now accept an implied contract exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine. See BNA REPORT, supra note 23, at 8. These cases are of little practical value 
to most at-will employees. Employees whose freedom from discharge without cause is guaranteed 
by a specific oral promise or an employee handbook provision are not those whose vulnerability 
is of greatest concern. 
45. See ABA COMM. ON DEV. OF THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESP. IN THE 
WORKPLACE, 2 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW l (1982). The Committee warns: 
Toussaint and similar decisions are likely to be limited to higher-ranking employees 
so far as assurances at hiring are concerned. Personnel manuals could potentially have 
a much broader application. But protection can probably be eliminated if an employer 
refrains from any assurances or promises, oral or written, at any time. In Novosel v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law), 
an employee was held not entitled to a just cause determination prior to severance where 
the employment contract permitted termination cause or notice. Personnel manuals and 
employee handbooks have been rejected as the basis for legally binding modifications 
of the at-will employment doctrine in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and New York. 
Id. at 18. 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
47. Blumrosen, supra note 4. The articles focuses on § 703(a) of Title VII which provides 
that it: "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer"-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1976). 
48. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
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women. If a principle of just cause has emerged from the administrative 
and judicial actions under Title VII, that principle is now applicable 
to all workers. " 49 
To determine the scope of McDonald, one must first examine the 
line of cases from which McDonald stemmed. A suitable beginning 
is Griggs. v. Duke Power Co., so an early Title VII case, in which the 
Supreme Court examined an employer's use of standardized tests to 
screen job applicants. In evaluating this practice, the Court considered 
Title VII and succinctly stated: "Discriminatory preference for any 
group, minority or majority is precisely and only what Congress has 
proscribed." 51 
It is thus apparent from the beginning that Title VII's protections 
accrue to those discriminated against on the basis of religion or on 
the basis of personal characteristics present at birth. Title VII is a con-
gressional attempt to compel employers to treat job applicants and 
employees as individuals, not as members of racial groups. 
Cases discussing what a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate to place 
upon an employer the burden of justifying its actions bolster this in-
terpretation of Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 52 the 
Court was confronted with a case in which discriminatory hiring prac-
tices were alleged. In discussing what a Title VII plaintiff must do to 
shift the burden of going forward to the employer, the Court said: 
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden 
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs 
to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications. 53 
In a foot;note, the Court cautioned that the facts and, consequently, 
the prima facie proof required from plaintiffs, would necessarily vary 
in Title VII cases. 54 Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie 
case the burden is on the employer "to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 55 The plaintiff may 
49. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 524 (footnote omitted). 
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
51. Id. at 431. 
52. 411 U .s. 792 (1973). 
53. Id. at 802. 
54. Id. at 802 n.13. 
55. Id. 
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rebut this reason by demonstrating that the purportedly legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext. 
For present purposes, we need not examine what the Court has said 
in subsequent cases about an employer's obligation to come forward 
with responsive proofs, or the plaintiff's opportunity to rebut. We focus 
instead on what constitutes a plaintiff's prima facie case under Title VII. 
In McDonald the issue was whether Title VII protection extended 
to two whites who, with a black worker, were involved in a single 
episode of employee misconduct. The two whites were fired; the black 
was retained. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall indicated that 
although the McDonnell Douglas procedure required plaintiffs to show 
a racial element in the employer's actions, McDonnell Douglas did not 
imply a substantive limitation that blacks alone benefit from Title VII. 
According to the McDonald Court, "Title VII prohibits racial 
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same 
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson [the 
retained black] white." 56 
What protection do blacks and whites alike enjoy under Title VII? 
McDonald simply extends to whites that which McDonnell Douglas 
gives to blacks: the opportunit)' to force an employer to justify its ac-
tions if and only if the employee can first show a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination. 
The Court has most recently reiterated this point in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States57 and Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters. 58 Professor Blumrosen relies on these cases to sup-
port his thesis that Title VII presently provides a remedy against un-
just discharge for all employees. He believes that the McDonald holding, 
that Title VII applies to both blacks and whites, implicitly creates a 
good cause standard for all discharges: 
If an employer is required by Title VII to have good reasons 
for its personnel actions with respect to minorities and women, 
then, under McDonald it must apply the same principle and 
standards to its white male employees. The result is a de facto 
substantive law rule requiring the employer to produce good 
reasons or just cause for adverse personnel actions. Thus the 
common law rule is abolished in toto. 59 
The difficulty with this view is that Title VII does not protect all 
56. 427 U.S. at 280. 
57. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
58. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
59. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 560. 
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blacks and women, or all white males, from discharge absent just 
cause. 60 Rather, it protects employees only to the extent that they can 
make out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment. 61 Consequently, 
Title VII is of little help to a black who is fired by a black-owned 
business and replaced by another black, to a female who is discharged 
and later replaced by another woman, or to a white male who is replaced 
by another white male. Title VII does not bar any arbitrary discharge 
that is not racially motivated. Because of this, we believe that Title 
VII does not furnish a general solution to the problem of unjust 
discharge for employees. 
2. The Constitution- Professor Cornelius J. Peck has argued that 
the federal Constitution should be read to provide protection against 
unjust discharge. 62 He believes that when a private employee is dis-
charged without just cause and without an apparent remedy, he has 
suffered a deprivation of "property" within the constitutional pro-
hibition against the taking of life, liberty, or property without due 
process. 63 To find such a deprivation, there must be both a "property" 
interest and "state action. " 64 
It is true that on occasion employment has been held to be a property 
interest entitled to constitutional protections. In both Perry v. 
Sinderman65 and Arnett v. Kennedy, 66 government employment was 
found to be property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 67 
As the Supreme Court has recently observed, though, ''the Constitu-
tion does not create property interests. Rather it extends various pro-
cedural safeguards to certain interests 'that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.' '' 68 
60. The thesis that Title VII presently provides a remedy for the unjust discharge of an 
unorganized privately employed white male is here evaluated in light of the cases that were decided 
prior to the publication of Professor Blumrosen's article. More recent is the case of United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Although explicitly limiting its ruling to 
an examination of voluntarily adopted "bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial 
preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the [plan there considered]," Weber 
clearly suggests that Title VII must be viewed foremost as a remedial measure for the benefit 
of the classes that Congress viewed as having been the historical objects of discrimination. But 
see Note, Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs: Reconciling Teamsters, Weber, and the Goal 
of Equal Employment Opportunity, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1982) (arguing that Weber is 
limited to its facts). 
61. We do not believe that minorities and women can, as a practical matter, shift the burden 
to an employer to justify a discharge merely by asserting that the discharge was motivated by 
bias. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-254 (1981). 
62. Peck, supra note 4. 
63. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. 
64. Peck, supra note 4, at 13-35. 
65. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
66. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
67. Government employment continues to be accepted by the judiciary as property protected 
by the constitutional safeguard of due process. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
68. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979) (per curiam). 
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In· other words, a private employee's job is constitutionally protected 
only if the employee has an identifiable property interest in that job 
deriving from a source extraneous to the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion cannot protect a "right" if the right itself does not exist. The 
plaintiff in Perry was entitled to his job by virtue of a de facto tenure 
system at the university which employed him, while civil service gave 
the plaintiff in Arnett a continued substantive right to employment. 
In the absence of such a substantive right, one does not reach the ques-
tion of how to safeguard that right. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth69 illustrates this point 
perfectly. Decided the same day as Perry, Roth involved an untenured 
university professor who had been hired for a fixed term of one aca-
demic year. Roth completed the year, but was told that he would not 
·be rehired for the next academic year. The Supreme Court held that 
Roth had no property right that was protected by procedural due pro-
cess. It explained that "[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created 
by the Constitution," but "are created and their dimensions are defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law." 10 
Presently, the only source of substantive employment rights for most 
unorganized privately employed individuals is the oral employment con-
tract, which the courts have held to be terminable at will. 11 State law, 
then, does not create a substantive property right which the procedural 
safeguards of the Constitution may be called upon to protect. 
The second aspect of the constitutional analysis is equally trouble-
some. One must find state action to state a case of constitutional di-
mension. Acknowledging this requirement, Professor Peck argues that 
omitting unorganized, privately employed individuals from an other-
wise comprehensive package of legislative protections precluding 
discharge without just cause constitutes state action. 
Remedial legislation proscribing discriminatory treatment on the basis 
of sex, race, 12 age, 73 and disability74 is already in place. Civil service 
legislation protects many, if not most, government employees. 75 There 
is also express legislative76 and judicial77 support for the right to organize 
and the grievance and arbitration procedures enjoyed by workers covered 
69. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
70. Id. at 577. 
71. But see cases cited supra note 44. 
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
73. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. llI 1979). 
74. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 i (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1974). 
75. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-754 (Supp. II 1978). 
76. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. V 1981). 
77. See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (discussing the duty of fair representa-
tion as it relates to the processing of grievances to arbitration). 
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by collective agreements. This comprehensive scheme, Professor Peck 
argues, provides an outside objective review of discharges. He therefore 
believes that it is state action when an employer's decision to discharge 
is facilitated by the narrow window in all this protective legislation 
that exposes the unorganized, privately employed individual to arbitrary 
action. 78 
The Supreme Court, however, would be unlikely to find state action 
in a failure to legislate. In recent cases the Court has shied away from 
finding state action where private parties are the primary actors. For 
example, the Court has ref used to find state action in a private lien 
foreclosure sale19 or when a highly regulated monopoly utility terminates 
service for nonpayment of user charges, so even though such a utility 
arguably functions in virtual partnership with government. Similarly, · 
the Court found no state action in a private club's refusal to admit 
a black guest to its lodge, even though the state tightly controlled the 
club's right to serve liquor by the glass. 81 In notable dictum, Justice 
Rehnquist recently stated in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks82 that the Supreme 
Court "has never held that a state's mere acquiescence in a private 
action converts that action into that of the State. " 83 Looking at these 
recent cases, we think it most unlikely that the courts will soon find 
an activity of a private person or entity to be state action solely because 
the government has declined to include the activity within the scope 
of legislation. 
Moreover, it is not wholly accurate to say that the government has 
erected structures providing just cause determination for all groups 
except unorganized, privately employed white males. As discussed above, 
we do not believe that Title VII provides a just cause determination 
for every discharged minority or female worker, but only for those 
who establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 84 Similarly, 
the NLRA and a union's duty of fair representation do not provide 
a substantive right to employment tenure from management or to just 
cause determinations of discharges. The duty of fair representation, 
78. Peck, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
79. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
80. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
81. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Supreme Court has found state 
action in the discriminatory practices of a lessee of a municipal parking ramp, Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and in the passage of a California initiative barring open 
housing laws, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S 369 (1967). In both cases, though, the state was 
an actual party to the activity claimed to be state action. 
82. 436 u.s 149 (1978). 
83. Id. at 164. 
84. Moreover, the disparate benefit to minorities and women of civil rights legislation has 
received at least implicit approval from the Supreme Court. See United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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stemming from the union's exclusive right to speak for the employee, 85 
serves only ro asssure that such substantive and procedural rights as 
the employee receives from the contract will be enforced. The duty 
of fair representation does not give a unionized employee the right 
to arbitration. That right, if it exists, comes from the contract; the 
duty of fair representation simply requires the union to enforce fairly 
this contractual right. Thus, the premise that the government has erected 
protective structures enabling minority, female, and organized workers 
to avoid discharges unsupported by just cause is faulty. Minorities and 
women still must make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The 
organized worker receives from the law only the assurance that the 
union will fairly enforce contractual rights against unjust discharge. 
D. The Judiciary 
Several writers have suggested ways for the judicial branch to pro-
tect employees against unjust discharge. Professor Lawrence Blades, 
for example, urges courts to fashion a remedy in tort for "abusive" 
discharge: "the afflicted employee [should have] a personal remedy 
for any damage he suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his 
employer's attempt to intimidate or coerce him in a way which bears 
no reasonable relationship to the employment. " 86 This tort would be 
analogous to the abuse of process tort in attempting to punish as 
unlawful lawful acts which are performed with improper motives. 87 
Professor Blades acknowledges, though, that the employer would retain 
the "power" to discharge. 88 In keeping with the tort formulation of 
this cause of action, punitive damages would be available to an ag-
grieved employee. 89 
Professor John Blackburn advocates contract rather than tort as the 
proper arena for change. 90 Instead of creating a new tort to balance 
a continuing power to discharge without just cause, he suggests redefin-
ing the terms of oral employment contracts. 
Professor Blackburn argues that the employment-at-will doctrine is 
a judicial creation designed to add a durational term to an employ-
ment contract that does not address duration. He believes that the courts 
should cease to inf er that parties intend employment to be terminable 
at will. In the absence of information on what employers and prospective 
employees expect when they enter into an employment relationship, 
85. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
86. Blades, supra note 4, at 1413. 
87. Id. at 1423-24. 
88. Id. at 1423. 
89. Id. at 1427. 
90. Blackburn, supra note 4. 
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courts should presume that each expects the relationship to continue 
as long as the employee adequately performs the job. 9 ~ 
There is certainly no doubt that the judiciary has the power to work 
such changes in the common law. The great bulk of tort law is common 
law, developed over the centuries in continuing adaptation to changing 
circumstances and evolving notions of fairness. The courts' ability to 
effect dramatic evolutions in the law of contract is equally clear. It 
is unlikely, however, that such a fundamental change in the law of 
the workplace will emerge out of the judiciary. Robert Howlett, former 
chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission and of 
the Federal Services Impasse Panel, and a respected advocate for change 
in this area, has concluded that "the courts, in the foreseeable future 
are unlikely . . . to expand the 'just cause' doctrine to include 
discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, unfair or unreasonable discharge 
or discipline. " 92 Professor Summers also believes that "the Courts are 
not likely to develop legal theories that will give any meaningful pro-
tection againt unjust dismissal." 93 
There is good reason for this belief. Abolishing the employment-at-
will rule, either on a tort or contract theory, would result in a funda-
mental change in employment law. Were the legislature to initiate such 
a change, the final product would emerge only after extensive political 
debate. Unlike a court, which is primarily concerned only with the 
arguments of the litigants before it, a legislative body could draw on 
all segments of society for assistance in drafting a broad remedy for 
the problem of unjust discharge. 
Ill. A STATUTORY APPROACH 
A. State Legislative Efforts 
Only a few state legislatures have formulated statutory protection 
against unjust discharge for all employees. 94 A Missouri statute requires 
any corporation, upon written request of a former employee who has 
91. Id. at 18-24. 
92. Howlett, Due Process for Non-Unionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, 32 INDUS. 
REL. ,~ESEARCH Ass'N PROC. 165 (1979). 
93. Summers, supra note 4, at 491. 
94. The Connecticut legislature has twice rejected such legislation - in 1973 (Comm. Bill 
No. 8738) and in 1975 (Comm. Bill No. 5151). The 1975 bill proposed discharge only for just 
cause, a bona fide business reason, or because of a reduction in force, and stipulated that an 
employee was entitled upon request to a written statement giving reasons for dismissal. In addi-
tion, it advocated a grievance procedure, including a preliminary investigation by the Connec-
ticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration and, on a finding of probable cause, binding arbitra-
tion. Similar bills have ben introduced in Michigan (Mich. H.B. 5892) (introduced June 17, 1982), 
Pennsylvania (Penn. H.B. 1742) (introduced July I, 1981), and New Jersey (Ass. B. 1832) (in-
troduced June 16, 1980). 
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voluntarily quit or been discharged after at least ninety days of service, 
to provide the employee with a letter stating ''the nature and character 
of the service rendered by such employee to such corportion and dura-
tion thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee 
has quit such service. " 95 Missouri courts have held that the cause of 
discharge must be provided on request, notwithstanding the use of the 
term "quit" in the quoted clause. Although disputes have arisen as 
to the scope of this statute there is no authority holding that the statute 
provides a substantive right to be free from unjust discharge. 96 
In South Carolina, the Department of Labor, pursuant to statute, 
mediates disputes between all employers and unorganized employees 
over involuntary terminations, unfair hiring practices, and unfair pro-
motional practices. 97 The Commissioner of Labor also may appoint 
arbitrators or act as arbitrator if requested by both sides. In 1978 there 
were 3,129 complaints, including 2,621 involving involuntary termina-
tions. According to the Commissioner, 92% of all complaints were 
resolved. 98 
Although no state has legislated protection against unjust discharge 
for all employees, many states have recently enacted statutes forbid-
ding employers from firing or disciplining workers for going on jury 
duty, testifying in criminal trials, doing military or reserve duty, ob-
taining mental health treatment, or filing worker's compensation 
claims. 99 Congress also has acted to protect "whistleblowers" against 
employee reprisals for calling attention to violations of laws dealing 
with environmental protection, product safety, and consumer protec-
tion. 100 In 1980, the state of Michigan enacted a law protecting whistle 
blowers. 101 
South Dakota is the only state to enact a law significantly restricting 
the employment-at-will doctrine per se. A person hired at an annual 
salary in South Dakota is presumed to have been hired for one year. 
An employer wishing to terminate such an employee before the year 
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1978). 
96. Recent amendments to this law place restrictions on the issuance of service letters and 
address the issue of punitive damages. Employers of seven or more employees must now issue 
service letters to employees who have worked for at least 90 days and who have requested a 
service letter within one year of the date of discharge or voluntary quitting. Daily Labor Report 
No. 250, Dec. 29, 1982, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C. 
97. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 41-17-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute also protects organized 
workers. 
98. Letters from E. McGowan, Commissioner of Labor, to R. Howlett (Aug. 6, 1979) (on 
file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
99. See DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to 
Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. I, 20-21. See generally Malin, Protect-
ing the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983). 
100. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 99, at 21-23. 
IOI. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 15.361-.369 (1981) (MICH. STAT. ANN.§§ 17.428 (Callaghan 
1982)). For a comprehensive discussion of this statute, see Malin, supra note 99, at 304-07. 
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ends must show that the discharge is justified by "habitual neglect or 
continued incapacity to perform or willful breach of duty by the 
employee.'' 102 
B. The Need for a Federal Statute 
The developments noted above may indicate a trend among the states 
toward broader protection against unjust discharge. They may, however, 
represent only specific responses to particular employer practices inter-
fering or conflicting with existing legislation and public policy. Professor 
Alan Westin sees a trend - at least in these actions - toward guaran-
teeing an individual the right to fair and equitable treatment and due 
process in key employment decisions. 103 He may be right. It will take 
many more years though, at the current rate of change, before one 
can reasonably expect judicial recognition of employees' general right 
to protection against unjust discharge or discipline in the workplace. 
Piecemeal legislation and narrow judicial decisions are of only limited 
value. The appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust discharge 
is comprehensive federal legislation. 
There are, of course, good reasons to focus on state legislatures as 
the primary arena for statutory reform. Enacting such legislation on 
a state-by-state basis would permit the variety and experimentation that 
is necessary to test new legislation before introducing it into the federal 
system. 104 As a practical matter, it may also be easier to persuade a 
few of the more progressive state legislatures to break new ground in 
this area than it would be to move such legislation through both houses 
of Congress and across a president's desk. 
Despite these considerations, we believe that a federal statute is the 
preferable vehicle for achieving reform. Unjust discharge is a problem 
common to every state. More significantly, national legislation is 
necessary because any attempt to introduce protection against unjust 
discharge into a single state would almost certainly be met with the 
argument that the additional burden on employers would make that 
state less attractive to industrial and commercial development. 105 This 
argument is especially compelling when, as now, the economy is in 
recession and many states are finding it difficult to attract new 
businesses. 
102. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-5 (1978). 
103. A. Westin, Report on Legislative and Judicial Developments on Employee Rights, 1979-80, 
at 1-2 (paper presented at the third National Seminar on Individual Rights in the Corporation, 
June 12, 1980, Wash. D.C.) (on file with the authors). 
104. Summers, supra note 4, at 521. 
105. See, e.g., Wilson, Comment on "Due Process for Nonunionized Employees, 33 INDUS. 
REL. RESEARCH Ass'N PROC. 181 (1981). 
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The remainder of this Article outlines a number of considerations 
which drafters of a federal statute protecting against unjust discharge 
should take into account. 
1. Scope- In principle, a case can be made for providing protection 
against all unjust discipline. ' 06 Such broad coverage in new legislation, 
however, would be politically impractical and economically unwise. In-
cluding all disciplinary actions - rather than only discharges - in 
such legislation would cause a huge caseload for the administering 
agency and dramatically increase administration costs. Limiting the 
statute to discharge actions, including cases of "constructive discharge" 
(cases in which the employee is coerced into resigning or is presented 
by the employer with intolerable alternatives to resignation), would 
make the legislation more acceptable to legislators, members of the 
business community, and the general public. In subsequent years, the 
statute could be modified to include or exclude additional types of 
discipline as experience dictated. 
2. The "just cause" concept- Arbitration provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements almost always provide that discharge or discipline 
must be for "just cause," though the term is rarely defined. Some 
forty years of experience and thousands of arbitration decisions in the 
United States, however, have given both substantive and procedural 
content to the just cause standard. 
A statutory attempt to define just cause, or to enumerate employee 
acts that would constitute cause for discharge, would likely lead to 
a great deal of unnecessary litigation. Unjust discharge legislation 
therefore should not include a separate definition of just cause. Rather, 
it should incorporate the body of industrial common law that already 
exists. 
What is just cause for discharge in some situations may not be just 
cause in others. 101 A large number of experienced arbitrators, however, 
have applied the just cause standard in discharge cases; thousands of 
their decisions have been published. 108 In an experiment conducted with 
his class of third-year law students, Professor Robben Fleming found 
that "[i]n the discipline and discharge areas there is now a sufficient 
body of experience in published cases and texts to guide an inexperienced 
decision-maker to the 'general rule.' " 109 
This substantial body of decisions and number of experienced ar-
bitrators were not available when other countries enacted unfair dismissal 
106. Summers, supra note 4, at 521. 
107. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 28, at 610-66. 
108. At least two private companies publish these decisions - the Bureau of National Af-
fairs, Inc., Washington, D.C. (LABOR ARBITRATION REPORTS), and Commerce Clearing House, 
Inc., Chicago, Ill. (LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS). 
109. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 83 (1965). 
Q 
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laws. These resources should prove valuable in the administration of 
any American statute, whether enacted at the federal or state level. 
3. Employer coverage- Practical considerations dictate an 
exemption for small employers; a sensible line of demarcation would 
be a work force of ten. Other social legislation, such as Title VII, already 
exempts small employers. 110 Were the exemption level set much higher 
than ten employees, however, many employees who most need protection 
might lose it. Great Britain's experience with this issue indicates that 
employees in small firms have a greater need for protection and have 
used the unfair dismissal law more often than those in medium-sized 
and large companies. 111 
Employers who are parties to collective bargaining agreements pro-
viding final and binding arbitration of discharge grievances should also 
be excluded from coverage. Similarly, an unjust discharge statute should 
permit the supervising governmental agency to exempt employers with 
voluntary system that meet specified minimum standards. 
4. Employee eligibility- Employees who are already protected 
against unjust discharge through collective bargaining agreements, civil 
service systems; teachers tenure laws, or individual contracts of em-
ployment are adequately protected and may fairly be excluded from 
coverage. A more difficult problem is the potential overlap between 
an unjust discharge statute and other antidiscrimination laws. Ideally, 
all discharge complaints should be resolved in a single forum, whether 
it be the courts, the NLRB, an existing administrative agency charged 
with resolving discrimination claims, or a new administrative agency 
established by an unjust discharge statute. A discharged employee who 
files a claim in any of these forums should be barred from seeking 
relief under an unjust discharge statute. 
Statutes in other countries and almost all collective bargaining 
agreements require a minimum period of service before an employee 
becomes entitled to protection against unjust discharge. In order that 
employers retain the necessary flexibility in determining employee 
suitability for continuing employment, a six-month service requirement 
should be a prerequisite for employee eligibility under an unjust 
discharge statute. 
Coverage should extend to all employees except those in relatively 
high managerial positions with policy-making responsibility and persons 
working under fixed-term contracts of at least two years duration. Super-
visors and foremen, who are not covered by the NLRA, however, should 
be included. As Professor Summers points out, the NLRA's exclusion 
of supervisors is based upon a potential conflict of interest in union-
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). 
111. Dickens, Unfair Dismissal Applications and the Industrial Tribunal System, 9 INDUS. 
REL. J. 7 (1978-79). 
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management relations that is not relevant to an unjust discharge 
statute.' 12 Indeed, this gap in the NLRA probably exposes supervisors 
and foremen to arbitrary discharge to an even greater extent than 
bargaining-unit employees who are usually protected by the just cause 
requirement of a collective bargaining agreement. 
5. Conciliation- Empirical data from Great Britain and West 
Germany indicate that an informal conciliation procedure can resolve 
a substantial proportion of unjust discharge claims without the use 
of a formal hearing. 113 An unjust discharge statute should, therefore, 
provide for mediation by either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service or an appropriate state agency before a complaint is certified 
for hearing and arbitration. Unions and employers already utilize federal 
and state mediators to conciliate grievance disputes, though published 
statistics demonstrating the frequency of this activity are not available. 114 
Conciliation not only can speed the resolution of complaints but can 
reduce administration costs by limiting the number of cases going to 
formal hearing and arbitration. 
6. Remedies- The United States and Canada are the only countries 
in which reinstatement is the normal remedy when an individual is found 
to have been discharged without just cause. Some collective bargaining 
agreements require reinstatement in such cases. Even where the contract 
is silent on the remedy for unjust discharge, arbitrators almost invariably 
direct that the employer reinstate the employee with full, partial, or 
no back pay depending on the circumstances of the case. Several studies, 
however, have found that employees do not exercise their right to return 
to their former jobs. 115 Instead, they often negotiate with their employers 
for an alternative remedy; the arbitrator is not involved in these 
discussions. 
An unjust discharge statute should specifically allow reinstatement 
with back pay as a remedy. The arbitrator should also be free, however, 
to award compensatory damages in lieu of reinstatement when it appears 
that reinstatement would be impractical. Damages are likely to be a 
superior remedy to reinstatement more often under a statute than in 
situations governed by union-management agreement. As Professor 
Getman notes, the reinstatement remedy works reasonably well in a 
unionized plant because of the presence of a union to protect a reinstated 
I 12. Summers, supra note 4, at 526. 
I 13. Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 CoMP. LAB. L. 
233-36 (1980); Falke & Gessner, The Conciliation Procedures Before the German and Belgian 
Labour Courts (unpublished paper prepared for the Law and Society Association and the LSA 
Research Committee on Sociology of Law, June 5-8, 1980) (on file with the authors). 
114. 31 FMCS ANN. REP. 24 (1978). 
115. See G. ADAMS, supra note 29, at 41; Holly, supra note 29, at 16; Jones, supra note 
29, at 167. 
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employee from retaliation by an employer after he returns to the job. 116 
Nonunion employees reinstated pursuant to an unjust discharge statute 
would not enjoy such protection. Moreover, the typical arbitration case 
involves a fairly large establishment, where the personal contact between 
the reinstated employee and the employer is likely to be quite limited. 
A large establishment also has more options in the placement of the 
employee. For example, it can assign a reinstated employee to work 
under a different supervisor than the one who was involved in the 
discharge. In a statute covering nonunionized workplaces employing 
as few as ten employees, reinstatement may appear unworkable or un-
desirable from the perspectives of both the employer and the employee. 
In such cases, arbitrators should have the option of awarding compen-
sation in lieu of reinstatement. 
7. Cost- In principle, the cost of administering an unjust discharge 
statute should be borne by the government. To discourage frivolous 
complaints, though, both parties should be assessed a filing fee that 
would be returned to the prevailing party. The assessment could either 
be a relatively modest flat fee, such as one hundred dollars, or a per-
centage of the discharged employee's weekly earnings - perhaps twenty-
five percent. The parties would also be required to pay any counsel 
and witness fees, thereby leaving the state with the remaining expenses 
of the arbitration process. A party who requests a transcript of the 
proceedings should be required to bear that expense. 
8. The tribunal- An unjust discharge statute should provide for 
a final and binding decision by a single arbitrator. To the extent possi-
ble, the arbitration selection procedures used under collective agreements 
should be followed. These usually provide for joint selection of the 
arbitrator from a qualified panel and appointment by the administer-
ing agency if the parties cannot agree. Hearings should be relatively 
informal and the judicial system's rules of evidence should not apply. 
Court review of the arbitrator's decision should follow the principles 
established in the Steelworkers trilogy. 111 To reduce costs, arbitrators 
should be encouraged to write brief decisions. A practical means of 
encouraging such brevity would be to pay arbitrators their expenses 
and an approved per diem rate, and limit the number of days per case 
to twice the number of hearing days. 
States may wish to consider employing staff arbitrators on a full-
time basis as an alternative to paying outside arbitrators on a per diem 
basis. Parties might be given the choice of using such staff arbitrators 
116. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 934-38 (1979). 
117. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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or, if they pref er, selecting an outside arbitrator. In the latter event, 
the parties could share the costs on a tripartite basis with the agency. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have offered suggestions and guidelines for an 
unjust discharge statute. There are, of course, many alternative ap-
proaches to the issues discussed, as well as other issues that unjust 
discharge legislation would need to address. Our main objective here 
is to stimulate discussion and debate among academics, practitioners, 
legislators, and others in dealing with a problem that cries out for at-
tention. There is no reason that the United States, which has led the 
way in providing fair and effective procedures against unjust discharge 
for organized employees, should lag behind other countries in providing 
equivalent protection for the vastly larger number of unorganized 
employees. 

